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WHAT HAPPENS TO COUNTESS GESCHWITZ?
REVISITING HOMOSEXUALITY IN HORKHEIMER AND ADORNO

Kevin S. Amidon
Iowa State University

*

In the philosophical and culture-critical works of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, the concept of homosexuality exists almost always in close textual relation
to fascist domination. This is because they cannot see homosexual persons as existing outside the dominating discourses of the nineteenth-century bourgeois legal and
psychiatric explication of homosexuality. This issue throws the stakes of ethical reflection in Critical Theory into high relief, especially since feminist thinkers including
Judith Butler have recently provided a highly positive rereading of Adorno’s ethics. A
close reading of Adorno’s exploration of Alban Berg’s opera Lulu further demonstrates the labile ethical and philosophical status of homosexuality in Critical Theory.

*

Kevin S. Amidon (ksamidon@iastate.edu) teaches German Studies in the Iowa

State University Department of World Languages and Cultures, 3102 Pearson Hall,
Ames, IA, 50011, USA. © 2008 Kevin S. Amidon.

2

New York Journal of Sociology, 2008, Vol. 1

If we are to act ethically…we must avow error as constitutive of who we are.
Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself

The work of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory – and particularly
the individual and collaborative efforts of Max Horkheimer and Theodor
W. Adorno, who formed its center over more than three decades –
shows such diversity of method and focus that many of its most significant scholars and critics apply to it the term “interdisciplinary” with
substantial justification and without irony (Benhabib, Bonss, and
McCole 1993). Horkheimer and Adorno would doubtless have been
gratified at this stream of reception of their work, for they indeed
sought and developed an embedded critique of the inherent problems
of the control and instrumentalization of knowledge through academic
and scientific discipline from the inception of the concept of Critical
Theory itself in the mid-1930s. Nonetheless this interdisciplinarity
sometimes took such heterodox form that readers and scholars cannot
help but come to contradictory conclusions about the theories and arguments propagated by the many members of the school. These frictions in the school’s reception are further exacerbated by the ongoing
– and sometimes increasing – disciplinary divisions that separate the
fields with the greatest interest in the Frankfurt School’s work: sociology, philosophy, cultural and literary studies, and musicology. Furthermore, the established historical and critical narratives of the
school’s development, written by scholars including Martin Jay, Susan
Buck-Morss, and Rolf Wiggershaus, have provided generations of
scholars with such a thorough introduction to the school’s work that
they have reached the level of orthodoxy. Thus as rich as the Frankfurt
School’s legacy remains for scholars and critics in numerous fields,
new work on it must navigate carefully around these many disciplinary
investments, established orthodoxies, and standing controversies.
A growing stream of recent work in sociology and cultural studies
has attempted to make sense of a particularly troublesome sphere of
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the Frankfurt School’s interest: its approach to the multifarious social
and psychological aspects of sexuality. Sexuality complicates the historical and intellectual legacy of the school for many reasons. Some of
the work of several early and important members certainly takes
sexuality as its main critical focus. These members, however, were not
the inner circle (Horkheimer and Adorno), but rather (in the 1930s and
1940s) Erich Fromm and (in the 1940s and later) Herbert Marcuse,
both of whom came into conflict with Horkheimer and Adorno for the
potentially redemptive aspects of their analyses of the erotics of culture and society (Halle 1995; Dannecker 1997; Wheatland 2004;
Worrell 2006). These conflicts sometimes leave readers with a sense
that Horkheimer and Adorno could be curiously prudish, despite the
fact that one need not do more than scratch the surface of their work
to discover extensive reflection on sex and sexuality. Some of their
own close colleagues feared even that they might be seen as libertines: Leo Lowenthal’s first reaction to the manuscript of Dialectic of
Enlightenment (DoE) in 1944 was that it “may create the impression
that the program of free love is proclaimed” (Quoted in Schmidt 2007:
58). The second excursus in DoE, which analyzes the writings of the
Marquis de Sade, is of course only the most proximate cause of such
concerns (an issue trenchantly explored in Comay 2006). Nonetheless
recent scholarship that reevaluates the influence of Freudian psychoanalysis on Horkheimer and Adorno reinforces the sense that their philosophically generated abstraction of libidinal and erotic drives casts
attention away from the diverse lives of individuals in the service of
theoretical totalization (Halle 1995). Their choice to maintain a highbourgeois style of dress and domestic life and thereby to reject proletarian or radical trappings, heightened the sense of some critics (especially in the later 1960s) that too much deployment of authority lay
behind their critique of the authoritarian. The infamous “bared-breasts
incident” in Adorno’s lecture hall in Frankfurt in 1968 (recently reread
brilliantly in Lee 2006) has long been the central symbolic moment of
this tension.
It is in the inner circle’s interpretation and representation of homosexuality that their residual prudishness seems most dramatically
displayed. The few places in their work where they directly address the
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concept “homosexuality” indeed do read almost hair-raisingly, which
has occasioned reasoned critique in recent scholarship (Halle 1995;
Rycenga 2002). DoE contains the concept four times (though Halle and
Rycenga miss the later two). The first two sit in close proximity in the
sixth section of the “Elements of Antisemitism,” where a circuitous argument links “homosexual aggression” to antisemitic violence. The
first statement is surprisingly direct, and found in a sentence that must
rank among the very shortest in DoE: “The forbidden thing transmuted
into aggression is mostly of homosexual character” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1988: 201). 1 This argument is glossed further with specific –
and typically biologically-inflected – reference to Freud’s theorization
of projection as the correlative of the weakness of defense mechanisms oriented toward repressed elements of the ego: “under the
pressure of dammed-up homosexual aggression the psyche’s mechanism forgets its most recent phylogenetic achievement, selfawareness, and experiences that aggression as the enemy in the
world, the better to be able to confront it” (Adorno and Horkheimer
1988: 202). A first reading of this passage indeed raises the concern,
as Halle and Rycenga emphasize, that Horkheimer and Adorno interpret homosexuality entirely through Freudian categories. And one need
not dig deep in the extensive documents of the inner circle’s activity in
the 1940s to find evidence that Horkheimer, at least, chose to stick to
Freudian orthodoxy rather than accept Fromm’s views (Jay 1996;
Dannecker 1997). This problem in fact seems redoubled in the second
passage, for there seems to be no homosexuality without repressed
Oedipal aggression.
The remaining two references to homosexuality in DoE are found
in the final passage of the work, the extended and heterodox series of
fragmentary “Notes and Sketches” that represent the authors’ attempt
to begin to construct an “anthropology” – that typically German variety
of philosophical reflection on the characteristics and typology of the
human that has little to do with the Anglo-American academic disci-

1

Unless otherwise indicated in the references, all translations are by the author.

Amidon

5

pline that appropriated the moniker (Schmidt 1998). Remarkably, the
two longest of these fragments contain reflections on homosexuality,
and both make even more overt the links that Horkheimer and Adorno
posit between repressed homosexuality and fascism. The title of the
first and longest, “Human and Animal,” points directly at its German
anthropological spirit. The other is a remarkable text called “Interest in
the Body.” Both have drawn notice in the growing literature on sex,
sexuality, and gender in the Frankfurt School, but not for the deployment of the concept of homosexuality in them (Franks 2006: 205; Lee
2006: 116). Perhaps the most eye-popping statement about homosexuality in all of Critical Theory is the one in “Human and Animal,”
which is suffused with gendered and politically charged language difficult to render in English: “He [Mann] becomes woman [Weib], who
looks upon domination [Herrschaft]. Everyone in the fascist collective,
with its teams and work camps, is from tender youth on a prisoner in
solitary confinement; it breeds homosexuality” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1988: 269). The passage on homosexuality in “Interest in the
Body” reverses the focus, concentrating not on the power of fascism
but on the ways it embraces and transfigures the repressions and resentments of its own victims. In the bleak intellectual ocean of DoE,
with its breaking waves that seem to scour the veneer of liberation
from all human motivation to reveal a violent and dominating core,
this passage towers high. In it, the powerless, resentful, and manipulated lower members of a dominating society – victims or collaborators
as they may be – are necessarily homosexual and paranoid: “Such
enmity of the lowest for their own withered life, to which these homosexual and paranoid people themselves relate through murderous assault – this enmity, so carefully raised and nourished by the temporal
and spiritual higher-ups, was always an indispensible instrument of the
art of government” (Adorno and Horkheimer 1988: 249).
Halle, Dannecker, and Rycenga have analyzed the few other
passages of similar import in Adorno’s work in the decades after the
publication of DoE. The most interesting of them, “Sexual Taboos and
the Law Today,” was written for a collection of essays on sexuality and
crime published in 1963. After a lengthy exploration of the Freudian
theory of genital sexuality as an integrated stage of development sub-

6

New York Journal of Sociology, 2008, Vol. 1

sequent to earlier, partial stages, Adorno argues that sexual taboos in
late capitalist society take the form of prejudices that exclude anything
but the genital from the sphere of the sexual (Adorno 1977: 537-540).
He subjects several legally proscribed but discursively common
spheres of sexual practice to his Freudian-dialectical mode of analysis.
These include prostitution, sexual issues surrounding minors, and homosexuality. He concludes with a set of nine suggestions for empirical
social research on the justification and consequences of the legal proscription of sexual behaviors, and proposes that the “F-Scale” developed in The Authoritarian Personality (1950) to quantify fascist tendencies could provide a model for an ordering of sexually ‘criminal’
personality types (Adorno 1977: 551).
The analysis of homosexuality in “Sexual Taboos and the Law
Today” is the shortest of the three analyses of particular forms of proscribed sexual behavior, filling only one page-long paragraph. It is also
remarkably undialectical in character (though plenty of readers might
welcome more such respite from apparently gratuitous complexity in
Adorno’s work). There is plenty of Adorno’s trademark irony, of
course, but his condemnation of the retention of the notorious paragraph 175 of the German penal code in postwar West German law is
straightforward. He begins: “The abhorrent paragraph about homosexuals has been rescued for liberated Germany.” The rest of the passage, as Halle and Rycenga note, is remarkably retrograde, and almost
a museum of nineteenth-century arguments about the etiology and
cultural position of homosexuality. It discusses blackmail, the Freudian
theory of unresolved Oedipal conflict in homosexuality, and even the
“intellectual talents” of homosexuals, which he sees as potentially
damaged and lost to society because homosexuals must live in fear of
prosecution (Adorno 1977: 543-544). Nonetheless this set of antique
arguments has a dialectical introduction, a single sentence that completes the paragraph prior to it. And this sentence, while leaving fascism unmentioned, again links homosexuality and dominating intent in
ways familiar from DoE. It concludes Adorno’s argument that in bourgeois society, taboos often have the function of causing those people
most disadvantaged by them to internalize and recapitulate repression
by redirecting it outward toward others – the Freudian mechanism of
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projection. Adorno’s crowning example: “homosexuals among whom
the enthusiasm for virility couples with that for well-bred order [Zucht
und Ordnung], and together with the ideology of the noble body
stands ready for the persecution of other minorities like intellectuals”
(Adorno 1977: 543). Adorno’s dialectical silence about Nazism runs the
danger of deafening the reader in this sentence, and gives everything
in the following discussion of homosexuality a throwaway character. If
anything, the atypical undialectical flatness of that subsequent discussion represents Adorno’s mode of talking down to an audience whose
level of philosophical sophistication could not be assured.
What then, if anything beyond a cautionary tale of scholarly
meta-prejudice (an argument pursued in Schlipphacke 2001), can be
retrieved from Horkheimer and Adorno’s approach to homosexuality,
given that it recurrently and repetitively discusses homosexuality primarily if not only in the context of arguments about domination and
fascism? Many equivocal rationalizations are possible. First, especially
in DoE, the negativity of the presentation of all of the social phenomena of bourgeois society under late capitalism is absolute. Everything
is dissected in search of its residues of domination. Second, it is often
in the behavior of self-appointed ‘progressives’ or ‘liberators’ that
Horkheimer and Adorno detect particularly noxious – if unconscious –
residues of domination. Such skepticism bears more specific fruit in
works like Horkheimer’s essay on “Traditional and Critical Theory”
(1937) and his book Eclipse of Reason (1947), as well as Adorno’s essays like “Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America”
(1968/1969), which contain substantially more direct reflection on social and scholarly practice than does the rigorously theoretical and philosophical DoE. Third, Horkheimer and Adorno owe more to biological
and medical discourses of pathology and deviance than the traditional
historical and critical narratives of the development of their work have
allowed (Amidon 2008). Homosexuality was broadly if not universally
recognized as pathological in the early twentieth century. Even some
of the great crusaders for homosexual rights like Magnus Hirschfeld
argued that homosexuality was exclusively a biological and medical
concern, rather than a legal one, and if homosexual inclinations were
not inherently pathological, some manifestations of them were (Bul-
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lough 1994: 61-75; Amidon 2008a). Horkheimer and Adorno, despite
their nuanced and lively critique of scientific and medical disciplinarity,
did not give up scholarly knowledge production as a goal (if not the
goal) of their practice, and they accepted remarkably uncritically the
evaluation of homosexuality as pathological.
None of these rationalizations is remotely satisfactory, however.
Halle and Rycenga have shown how other scholars with methods and
goals congruent with Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s – meaning containing
embedded dialectical critique – have pointed the way out of what appears to be the trap of their approach to homosexuality. Halle finds a
historically embedded potential in Herbert Marcuse’s essay “On Hedonism,” published in Horkheimer’s Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in 1936.
Rycenga finds it in Raya Dunayevskaya’s arguments about revolution.
Neither, however, seeks in the structures and trajectories of Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s methods – and in the other branches of their
work that address culture and the arts – a fuller explanation of what
appears to be a moment of critical failure in their arguments about
homosexuality.
Recent feminist scholarship, which has provided numerous avenues for reviving the vigor of Critical Theory and its legacy, has
pointed to the potential development of a reading of Horkheimer and
Adorno that contributes both to a revival of Critical Theory’s contribution to scholarship and ethics under (post-) modern conditions and to
an adequate reading of the blind spots and inadequacies in the work of
Critical Theory’s founders. Only work that does both can in fact earn
the name ‘critical’ for itself, and this new feminist scholarship, found in
two superb recent essay collections, both published in 2006, does so.
The first is a special issue of the journal differences; the second is a
volume in the vigorous Penn State University Press book series on “ReReading the Canon” (Brown 2006; Heberle 2006). Despite ongoing interest, feminism has in fact had trouble approaching Critical Theory,
often precisely because its forbidding negativity seems unremediable
for interventions in social praxis (Schlipphacke 2001; Rycenga 2002;
Hewitt 2006; Lee 2006). But when feminism embeds its own critique
of such intervention, it embeds Critical Theory. Heberle explains:
“Adorno’s work may have unintended (by him) consequences for femi-
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nism that can only be discerned through open-ended and experimental
approaches to his work, which is open and experimental in its own
right” (Heberle 2006a: 3). Brown makes a similar and even stronger
argument: “Critical Theory is thus a model both for the complexity and
self-reflexivity feminist theory requires and also offers elegant insights
for contemporary work” (Brown 2006a: 5). Their arguments indeed
point the way toward an adequate contextualization of the problems in
Horkheimer and Adorno’s approach to homosexuality.
In 2002, the University of Frankfurt invited Judith Butler to give
the inaugural set of an ongoing series of lectures by major thinkers
named in honor of Theodor Adorno. In 2005 these lectures appeared
in English under the title Giving an Account of Oneself, and have contributed new energy both to Adorno scholarship in general and particularly to work that focuses on Adorno’s ethics (Butler 2005). Several of
the contributors to the Heberle and Brown essay collections see Butler’s arguments as providing a new basis for reengaging feminism with
Critical Theory. Her ideas can further provide the grounding for a clear
understanding of Horkheimer and Adorno’s claims about homosexuality. The key moment comes through careful attention to the rigorously
recursive relationship of the individual and the social in their work. In
their negatively valenced Critical Theory, any hypostasized claim about
either society or the individual is immediately suspect. All psychology
is sociology and vice versa. All philosophy is social science and vice
versa. Butler configures her own language in this spirit. The three
chapter headings of Giving an Account of Oneself represent this moment of the derivation of social content from ethical reflection: from
the individual (“An Account of Oneself”), to the power relations of the
socially active individual (“Against Ethical Violence”), to a concept that
inheres recursively ethical intersubjectivity in a social world (“Responsibility”). The center of the chapter on “Responsibility” contains Butler’s reading of Adorno’s ethics, derived primarily from lectures he
gave in 1963 and published under the title Problems of Moral Philosophy. Immediately she focuses on recursion, pushing the individual in
the direction of the social, placing herself and her reader within an implied sphere of ethical social practice through the use of the plural
first-person pronoun: “If the human is anything, it seems to be a dou-
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ble movement, one in which we assert moral norms at the same time
as we question the authority by which we make that assertion” (Butler
2005: 103). She resolves her argument into a highly positive reading
of Adorno’s ethical thought: “it is a model of ethical capaciousness,
which understands the pull of the claim and resists that pull at the
same time, providing a certain ambivalent gesture as the action of
ethics itself” (Butler 2005: 103). Finally, she concludes that the idea of
the autonomous ethical subject, despite its troubled history, cannot
and must not be allowed to wither completely:
This is not the death of the subject…but an inquiry into the
modes by which the subject is instituted and maintained, how it
institutes and maintains itself, and how the norms that govern
ethical principles must be understood not only to guide conduct
but to decide the question of who and what will be a human subject (Butler 2005: 110).

Thus Butler returns to the crucial moment in Horkheimer and Adorno’s
thought which itself generates their troubled reading of homosexuality:
all ethics that take individuals seriously contain exclusionary potential.
Butler’s argument brings Adorno’s thought closely into contact with
that of Michel Foucault, who also pursues the potentially exclusionary
power discourses of enlightened knowledge production, and therefore
also requires attention to the historicity of ethical processes. And it is
through the historical trajectory of the concept of homosexuality that
Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s blind spots can be brought into focus and
resolved into critical insight.
Same-sex-oriented sexual behavior is, of course, observable in
human history from the inception of the documentary tradition, and
inferable in prehistory through other anthropological and archaeological methods. The scholarly literature that explores the complexities of
the documentary tradition and how to read and analyze it to reveal the
often-proscribed forms of same-sex-oriented sexual behavior has
grown extensive and fascinating recently (Foucault [1978] 1990; Boswell 1980; Woods 1998; Fone 2000; Halperin 2002; Crompton 2003).
A key portion of this literature, however, insists appropriately that de-
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spite the increasingly well-documented historical and cultural ubiquity
of same-sex sexual behavior, the concept ‘homosexuality’ is an invention of the nineteenth century, derived largely from legal, medical, biological, and psychiatric interest (Greenberg 1988; Bland and Doan
1990; Halperin 1990; Oosterhuis 2000). ‘Homosexuality’ as a concept
– and therefore in many ways as a subject or identity position taken
by individuals to represent themselves – therefore contains the new
and often repressive moments of the legal, medical, and psychiatric
definition (and sometimes condemnation) of deviance, but at the same
time a new kind of definition of the self based on sexuality that seems
to promise liberation from repressive social and cultural norms. Foucault famously called this compelling but often counterintuitive modern
process of the co-determination of repression and liberation through
conceptualization the “putting into discourse of sex” (Foucault 1990:
12).
Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s negativity toward the concept of homosexuality derives from this historical process of the discursive codetermination of repression and liberation by a scholarly concept. Critical
Theory as idea and ideal, defined originally by Horkheimer in his “Traditional and Critical Theory” (1937), seeks as the fundamental moment
of its method a critique of the social function of the scholarlyphilosophical concept (Horkheimer 1970a: 39-46). In order to formulate his statement of the content of Critical Theory, however, Horkheimer drew on his own work from the year before about the status
and freedom of the bourgeois individual in society. This essay, entitled
“Egoism and the Freedom Movement: On the Anthropology of the
Bourgeois Era” (1936) argues that the bourgeois concept of selffulfillment through the exercise of personal freedom (i.e. egoism) is
the dialectical twin of the concept of unfettered and destructive capitalist competition of all bourgeois individuals with all others – and that
moral thought in both its Kantian and utilitarian forms collaborates in
this making-equivalent of personal freedom and competitive exploitation. The issue of sexuality enters in Horkheimer’s reading of repressive proto-bourgeois moralists like Savonarola, Luther, Calvin, and
Robespierre, as well as in Horkheimer’s deployment of Freud’s read-
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ings of the friction between culture and ego-driven competitiveness
(Horkheimer 1970b: 120-132, 155-156).
The fuller form of the exploration of the moment of sexuality in
Critical Theory arrives in DoE, particularly in the two “excurses” that in
fact form the core of the work’s analysis of cultural objects as the
grounds of philosophical understanding. The first of these excurses explores Homer’s Odyssey, a work that culminates in Odysseus’s reestablishment of the sexual order of the society of Ithaka through his
and his son Telemachos’s slaughter of the many dozens of freeloading
suitors of his wife Penelope. The second excursus analyzes the works
of the Marquis de Sade, and concludes, deploying Kant’s classical definition of the enlightened subject, that “the work of the Marquis de
Sade shows ‘understanding without control by another,’ that is the
bourgeois subject freed from guardianship” (Adorno and Horkheimer
1988: 93). For the Horkheimer and Adorno of DoE, “free” sexuality
cannot be anything of the sort, because it is only conceivable as taking
place between participants in the bourgeois moral-economic system of
the inexorable exploitation of all people by all people all of the time.
For them, then, the concept homosexuality – historically invented both
to defend and to condemn same-sex sexual behavior – cannot be anything but a constitutive part of this system of the recursive generation
of domination.
Adorno and Horkheimer therefore only use the term homosexuality to refer to a kind of social pathology, because their critique of
bourgeois society reveals – almost avant la lettre - that the term is derived from a nineteenth-century construction based on arguments
about pathology and deviance. In their understanding homosexuality
reveals a great deal about the repressive and dominating deployment
of Enlightenment science and medicine, but almost nothing about its
liberating spheres of rights, subjectivities, and expressions. Therefore
the case-study scholarship and highly personal advocacy of many of
the early German researchers and commentators on homosexuality,
from Karl Heinrich Ulrichs and Károly Kertbeny to Johann Ludwig Casper, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, and Magnus Hirschfeld, does not reach
the level of generality about the human, the social, and the conceptual
that Horkheimer and Adorno’s theoretical investments seem to de-
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mand, and are never mentioned in their work. It is not the diverse
sexual behavior of individuals that makes them squirm (and Horkheimer and Adorno would doubtless have loathed the concept of “sexual expression” for its unexamined conflation of behavioral and aesthetic categories). It is rather the ways in which the social and symbolic function and interpretation of that behavior often reveals potential or real violence, domination, and exploitation. They are also –
sometimes to a fault – never afraid to seek the dominating elements in
the motivations of those who would declare their own behavior
enlightened, liberated, or radical. Critics like Axel Honneth (himself a
successor to Horkheimer and Adorno in Frankfurt) have seen this as
evidence of a “sociological deficit,” but it might better be described as
an almost-too-radical dialectical critique – and thereby retention
through refiguration – of conceptual totalization that takes ironical and
dialectical revenge on its own advocates (Honneth 1991: 17; Jay
1984).
The most troubling aspect of Horkheimer and Adorno’s negatively dialectical deployment of the concept of homosexuality is that it
makes no attempt to account for the diversity of individual human beings and their practices. Butler explores how and where, in his ethically-oriented work, Adorno in fact developed a vigorous critique of
false universality as “violence” perpetrated on the individual (Butler
2005: 4-7). Nonetheless this spirit seems entirely absent in his and
Horkheimer’s approach to homosexuality, and it thus appears here
that their attempt to develop a philosophically grounded theory of society that links the anthropological (in the German sense of the conceptual analysis of the human) with the cultural (in the German sense
of the products of human effort in both the artistic and the economic
spheres) homogenizes the individual. Thus they slide easily into the
appearance of ignoring – or even backhandedly denigrating – the concerns of homosexual persons subject to the legal and psychiatric disciplinary regimes of their day. This blind spot represents a moment
where their dialectical method abruptly stands still – a potential which
became central to the inquiry and method of their colleague Walter
Benjamin, whose own later work seeks the discrete almost radically.
Adorno had vigorous debates with Benjamin about this issue in the
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1930s (Wiggershaus 1994: 210-218; Presner 2007: 16-19). The reality of social domination and conflict has vanished entirely into an endless sequence of dialectical recursions. That Adorno was aware of the
possibility of this failure, and therefore of the absurdity of the idea that
he might need to be absolved of it – a point Butler emphasizes – nonetheless does not cause it to disappear.
There is, however, a moment where Adorno’s astringent theoretical rigor does develop an almost disorientingly positive interpretation of the work of a particular artist – and particularly of one of his
works in which the representation of a homosexual person resolves
into the possibility of humanity at the level of discrete relationships.
That artist is Alban Berg, Adorno’s teacher of musical composition. The
work is Berg’s final, unfinished opera, Lulu. Adorno wrote extensively
about both, and explored with subtlety and care the many issues of
sexuality surrounding both Berg as a person and his opera. Nonetheless these readings again show Adorno’s fluctuating reticence to approach matters which take him from the level of the conceptual to that
of individual human beings, and therefore might raise the specter of
the deviant. In the midst of his most subtle and sympathetic forms of
critical argument, his blind spot remains.
Berg based his Lulu on a pair of plays by the German playwright
Frank Wedekind, Earth Spirit (Der Erdgeist, 1895) and Pandora’s Box
(Die Büchse der Pandora, 1902). Highly controversial in the first decades of the twentieth century, the plays narrate a series of the consummated and unconsummated sexual liaisons of Lulu. The final of
these is an unconsummated lesbian affair with Countess Geschwitz. All
lead to murder or suicide. Lulu herself – in the company of Geschwitz
– falls victim to Jack the Ripper at the end of the plays and the opera.
Berg had known Wedekind’s plays as early as 1904, and remained fascinated with them for his entire life. He began adapting them for the
text of his opera in 1928, and by the time of his death in 1935 had
completed two of the opera’s three acts, a five-part suite of orchestral
excerpts from the opera, and the text, musical sketch, fragments of
the orchestration, and suggestions for the complete instrumentation of
the third act. From these notes, the Viennese musicologist Friedrich
Cerha produced a full version of the orchestration of the third act that
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was published after the death of Berg’s wife Helene in 1976. This
‘completed’ version is now used regularly in performances of the work
(Perle 1985: 33-41, 275-277). The incredible and fascinating complexity of the opera makes it impossible to discuss in any detail here. The
work has drawn the admiration not only of philosophers and musicologists, but also of opera-going audiences. Rare among modern operas –
and almost unique among works composed with the rigorous twelvetone method of Berg’s teacher Arnold Schoenberg – the work achieves
regular performances in opera houses around the world. George Perle,
the most dedicated scholar of Berg’s music, goes so far as to call the
completed three-act Lulu “among the uniquely significant, uniquely
original, and supremely important musical creations of our century”
(Perle 1985: 280).
Adorno spent 1925 and 1926 studying with Berg in Vienna, and
developed a lifelong fondness for his teacher. He wrote a number of
extensive biographical essays about Berg, and also analyzed Berg’s
entire small but intense musical output. Much of this work was collected and reworked into a major monograph published in 1968
(Adorno 1971). It contains a remarkable dialectical formulation that
reveals Adorno’s conviction that true humanity might indeed keep one
at a distance from individual human beings. He in fact attributes this
character to Berg’s music: “No music of our time has been as humane
as his; that pushes it far away from human beings” (Adorno 1971:
330; compare Adorno 1991: 5). He then reformulates and expands
this same argument in praise of Lulu: “Berg’s music hits the pressure
point at which organized humanity cannot understand a joke, and just
this point becomes for him a refuge of the humane” (Adorno 1971:
333; Adorno 1991: 7). The monograph also demonstrates dramatically
how Adorno’s sensibilities could lead him to limit his own discussion of
matters of sexuality. The book’s second chapter is a thirty-three page
biographical “Erinnerung” (reminiscence). It contains much reflection
on Berg’s personal life and marriage, phrased with some delicacy and
distance: “The habitual underestimation of the sensual by the German
spirit was completely alien to Berg…. He handled his own person carefully and indifferently at once, like the musical instrument that he was
to himself” (Adorno 1971: 344; Adorno 1991: 16).
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These hyper-poetic phrasings have a rather saltier counterpart,
however. In 1955 Adorno wrote – and did not publish – an essay entitled “To the Memory of Alban Berg” that contained a much more frank
estimation of Berg’s sexuality and approach to it – including homosexuality. The editor of Adorno’s complete works indicates that Adorno
stipulated that the reflections not be published in his lifetime or that of
those mentioned immediately in it. Nonetheless Adorno suggested that
“after that I would like them to be printed, because I believe that I
have grasped something about Berg that would otherwise be lost”
(Tiedemann 1984: 645). Much reworked material from this essay
found its way into the 1968 Berg monograph, but not the most direct
material about sex and sexuality. The editors and translators of the
Berg monograph note this, but do not analyze it (Adorno 1991: 141).
In his unpublished reflections, Adorno describes Berg’s personal approach to sex and sexuality with something that approaches wistfulness – though Freudian language is, as always, not far away: “Berg’s
relationship to sexuality: he had a friendly attitude toward everything
sexual, like one sometimes finds among aristocrats – namely with a
kind of pride in others and in himself about every successful sexual
union, as if its affinity for death had been triumphantly put down”
(Adorno 1984: 490). Clearly, Adorno saw Berg’s sexuality as polymorphous, though in this page-long discussion homosexuality does not
appear.
In the final passages of the essay, however, homosexuality
erupts, and again in a curious, unstable, and dialectically overloaded
way. Adorno’s narrative first co-opts Berg into a sarcastic moment
edging on homophobia, and then – twenty-two pages after he discussed Berg’s attitudes toward sex in some detail – raises the possibility of Berg’s own homosexuality. The first moment comes at the only
point in Adorno’s writings on Berg where he mentions that Berg’s sister Smaragda lived openly as a lesbian. He does so snidely, in a passage that also seems to denigrate Berg’s wife, Helene:
I would also like to take note of Helene’s brother, Mr. Nahowsky,
who was homosexual and openly [sic] schizophrenic, but also of
unforgettable beauty. Smaragda, Berg’s sister, was for her part
lesbian, and among her girlfriends there was a most unsympa-
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thetic woman named Keller…. Berg and I enjoyed imagining for
ourselves a marriage between Nahowsky and Smaragda (Adorno
1984: 507).

This passage may be the exception that proves the rule posited by Rycenga: that Adorno “seems (blissfully?) unaware of lesbian possibilities” (Rycenga 2002: 375). It also does a factual and biographical injustice to Berg’s relationship to his sister, whom the composer defended in public and in writing. Recent commentators including Perle
and Mitchell Morris have explored the relationship between Alban and
Smaragda Berg (Perle 1985: 39-40; Morris 1995: 361-363).
Unsurprisingly, Adorno cannot conclude his essay without a direct denial that Berg himself was homosexual despite his interest in
issues of sexual and gender ambiguity. Again in an eye-popping metadialectical manner, Adorno does so in a passage that emphasizes, in
stark contrast to other points he makes, Berg’s “inhumanity”:

I possessed, in a certain measure, an organ for that part of him
that bordered on the inhumane, and which was perhaps related
to his charm, his female element. He was, moreover, not homosexual, but he passionately believed in Weininger and said once
that every decent human being most certainly has a female
component. This moment of inhumanity is to be understood in a
most emphatic sense, and is certainly not to be separated from
his relationship to death… (Adorno 1984: 511).

Once again, Adorno’s thought makes homosexuality inseparable from
death and the inhuman. In this essay he treats the individual sardonically, as the living site of critique, and does so to cast light upon the
greater dialectical importance of the conceptual. Berg himself even becomes a metaphor for this sublation of the individual into the realm of
principle:
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In the ten years that I knew him, I always more or less clearly
had the feeling that as an empirical human being he was not entirely there, did not really play along; he was the opposite of an
existential, self-identified human being…. Berg’s entire empirical
existence stood below the primacy of the work; he fashioned
himself into an instrument for it… (Adorno 1984: 511).

In the 1968 Berg monograph, this interpretation is phrased strikingly:
“Psychology transcends itself in Berg’s music” (Adorno 1971: 351). If,
for Adorno, anything can escape the Enlightenment-domination trap,
and even perhaps help individuals themselves to do so, it is Berg’s
music. Unfortunately, his moment of blindness about homosexuality
remains. Universally in Adorno’s thought, homosexuality as a concept
excludes the possibility of transcendent and self-transcendent aesthetic work from the position of homosexual self-identification.
Adorno’s interpretation of the relationship between Lulu and
Geschwitz in Berg’s opera bears the marks of this complex, metadialectical relationship to his teacher’s person, work, and memory. In
all of Adorno’s extensive writings on Berg, the lesbian relationship between Lulu and Geschwitz – unconsummated as it may be – is mentioned directly only once, in a lecture that Berg delivered to the audience before the premiere of Lulu in Frankfurt in 1960. 2 And once
again, in almost radical and radically poetic dialectical language, it
demonstrates the abjection of the individual human characters in the
opera in the service of the realm of ideas:

At the same time that points to the idea. In the same way that
the characters in the drama throw themselves away among the
hopeless and the lost – the compulsive Lulu, Geschwitz in sexual
thrall to her, Doctor Schön, and Alwa – so too does the opera….

2

The index to the English translation of the 1968 Berg monograph contains a list of

references to the characters in Lulu. Geschwitz does not appear (Adorno 1991: 149).
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It [the work] turns to rescue that which must carry the load of
universal scorn. That is the origin of its violence-free violence.
No other music of our time is so humane as that of Berg, and
people thus recoil from it. The phantasmagoria of grand opera as
which Lulu will represent itself to you is at the same time the
model of an artwork of real humanity (Adorno 1984a: 648-649).

Homosexual individuals certainly qualify in Adorno’s thought for conceptual inclusion in the sphere of those subject to universal scorn. But
he cannot bring himself to grant them, as individuals, any moment of
humanity. So his dialectics carry on inexorably, both aware and unaware at once of the blind spots within.
The incommensurabilities of the representation of homosexuality
in Horkheimer and Adorno thus display the dissonance between ethical
action (derived from and centered on the critical and self-critical subject, and therefore ‘capacious’ in Butler’s sense, meaning generating
and requiring intersubjective responsibility and respect) and ethical
systems (which as a historical and collective phenomenon under modern conditions embed enough of the repressive content of bourgeois
enlightenment to be always suspect). Because, for Horkheimer and
Adorno, homosexuality carries enough historically derived residues of
pathology that its foundation as a subject position is shaky, and also
because it has always been a key locus of the generation of bourgeois
discourses of ethical system-building, homosexual persons fall into a
gap in Critical Theory – just as they do in Kant’s ethics where they are
at their most abstract, in the Metaphysics of Morals (Comay 2006: 8).
For Adorno and Horkheimer, then, homosexuality as a concept is both
so historically and philosophically labile that it appears untenable as
grounding for the psychologically integrated critical subjectivity necessary to all ethics. Adorno approaches awareness of this in “Sexual Taboos and the Law Today”: “The question of the freedom of the will is
probably not at all to be solved abstractly, namely through ideal constructions of the individual and his character that exists purely for itself, but rather only in consciousness of the dialectics of individual and
society” (Adorno 1977: 548). Unfortunately, homosexuals as persons
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fall into the gap between individual and society because, according to
Horkheimer and Adorno, the concept that governs the possibility of
their self-identification belongs to neither, but only to the dialectical
detritus of enlightened domination. Their blind spots, however, can
help to illuminate the possibility of – and the importance of their contribution to – the ongoing process of the critical reconstruction of society.
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